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> > USA/Africa: Anthrax, History
and Security
> > Date distributed (ymd): 020725
> > Document reposted by Africa Action
> >
> > Africa Policy Electronic Distribution
List: an
> > information service provided
by AFRICA ACTION
> > (incorporating the Africa
> > Policy Information Center, The
Africa Fund, and the
> > American Committee on Africa).
Find more information
> > for action for
> > Africa at http://www.africaaction.org
> >
> > +++++++++++++++++++++Document
> > Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
> >
> > Region: Continent-Wide
> > Issue Areas: +security/peace+
+US policy focus+
> > +health+
> >
> > SUMMARY CONTENTS:
> >
> > In the New York Times of July
2, columnist Nicholas
> > Kristof attacked FBI foot dragging
in the
> > investigation of last year's
> > anthrax attacks. In particular,
Kristof pointed to the
> > failure of the FBI to fully investigate
"Mr. Z,"
> > rumored within the biodefense
community to be a prime
> > suspect. "If Mr Z. were an Arab
national, he would
> > have been imprisoned long ago,"
Kristof commented.
> > "Mr. Z" is identified elsewhere
in news stories and on
> > the internet as Steven J. Hatfill,
an American
> > bioterrorism specialist who is
reported to have served
> > in the Rhodesian military in
the 1970s.
> >
> > This posting contains excerpts
from two articles
> > relevant to this case and links
to additional sources,
> > preceded by a brief
> > background note and questions.
> >
> > +++++++++++++++++end
> > profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >
> > Summary Background Note
> >
> > * The world's largest outbreak
of human anthrax
> > occurred in rural Southern Rhodesia
(now Zimbabwe)
> > from 1978-80 where 10,738 cases
were recorded and 182
> > people died. There is significant
evidence that this
> > outbreak was the result of covert
action by Rhodesian
> > security forces, with the assistance
of South African
> > specialists in biological warfare.
> >
> > * Dr. Wouter Basson, the man
who headed South Africa's
> > biological warfare program, refused
to testify before
> > South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission,
> > and was acquitted by a South
African judge in April
> > 2002 on criminal charges of murder,
conspiracy, fraud,
> > and drug possession, despite
evidence presented by
> > witnesses in a trial which lasted
more than two years.
> > As a result, many details of
the South African and
> > Rhodesia covert operations in
this period still remain
> > obscure.
> >
> > * Steven J. Hatfill, a biodefense
specialist who was
> > employed at the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute
> > for Infectious Disease at Fort
Detrick, Maryland from
> > 1997 to 1999, and continues to
work in the biodefense
> > field, has been among those questioned
by the FBI in
> > connection with the anthrax attacks
of 2001. However,
> > critics say the investigation
has been lethargic.
> > Hatfill, born in St. Louis in
1953, reportedly served
> > with the Rhodesian Special Air
Squadron (SAS) and
> > Selous Scouts in the late 1970s,
and attended medical
> > school and worked in Rhodesia
and South Africa,
> > returning to the U.S. only in
1995. On July 1, Hatfill
> > took up a new job as associate
director of Louisiana
> > State University's National Center
for Biomedical
> > Research and Training, and the
Baltimore Sun reported
> > on July 18 that the FBI says
he is not a suspect.
> >
> > Whether or not Hatfill is fully
cleared or does prove
> > to be implicated in the 2001
attacks, one must
> > question both the previous
> > lack of U.S. government curiosity
about his background
> > and the failure of the U.S. media
to highlight the
> > 1978-80 anthrax attacks in Rhodesia
as a precedent to
> > current events. This history
also raises other
> > specific questions. Among them:
> >
> > (1) Has the FBI investigated
whether Hatfill had any
> > connection to the 1978-80 anthrax
outbreak in eastern
> > Zimbabwe?
> >
> > (2) What do other agencies of
the U.S. government know
> > about this outbreak and related
incidents in the
> > counter-insurgency wars waged
by the white minority
> > regimes in Southern Africa in
the 1970s and 1980s?
> > What did they know at the time?
> >
> > (3) Who has moral and legal liability
for the human
> > damage caused by these programs?
> >
> > (4) Given the failure to date
to expose this history
> > to full scrutiny, are there additional
legal or
> > official actions that could be
taken to facilitate the
> > efforts of investigative journalists
and scholars?
> >
> > Other sources available on-line,
in additional to
> > those excerpted below, include:
> >
> > David Martin, "Human Anthrax
Scares were a Major
> > Reality in Southern Africa"
> > Southern Africa News Features
> > http://www.sardc.net/editorial/sanf/2001/iss21/specialreport.html
> > [note: headline on article in
web version is
> > incorrect]
> >
> > Chapter 22, "Rhodesia, 1978"
in Tom Mangold and Jeff
> > Goldberg, Plague Wars. Macmillan,
2000. Full text of
> > chapter vailable on line at:
> > http://www.panmacmillan.com/PlagueWars
> >
> > Additional related news stories
can be located by
> > searching under "Steven Hatfill"
at
> > http://www.google.com
> >
> > ************************************
> >
> > Who is Steven Hatfill? The FBI
has searched a U.S.
> > bio-warfare scientist's apartment
as part of its
> > anthrax investigation.
> >
> > Laura Rozen
> >
> > American Prospect
> > Web Exclusive 6/27/2002
> >
> > [brief excerpts only; full text
at:
> > http://www.prospect.org/webfeatures/2002/06/rozen-l-06-27.html]
> >
> > FBI agents investigating last
fall's anthrax attacks
> > searched the Frederick, Maryland,
apartment of Steven
> > J. Hatfill, a former U.S. government
bio-defense
> > scientist, this past Tuesday.
Hatfill is not a suspect
> > in the anthrax case, the FBI
says. Rather,
> > law-enforcement officials have
told The Associated
> > Press that Hatfill consented
to the search in order to
> > clear his name, which The New
York Times reports has
> > been much mentioned on Web sites
frequented by
> > scientists, journalists, and
others who've taken an
> > interest in the anthrax investigation.
> >
> > Tuesday's search of Hatfill's
home by the FBI was
> > reportedly not the first time
the bureau has had
> > contact with him in the course
of its ongoing
> > investigation. Sources close
to the investigation say
> > that he had been questioned on
four previous occasions
> > by FBI investigators, and that
he'd been given, and
> > passed, a polygraph exam. These
sources also say that
> > Hatfill has always been very
cooperative with the
> > bureau.
> >
> > Who is Steven Hatfill? The Prospect
has spoken with
> > dozens of biowarfare scientists,
other government
> > contractors who work in bio-defense,
former medical
> > school associates and colleagues,
and sources close to
> > the FBI investigation to get
a clearer picture of the
> > Maryland scientist. Hatfill belongs
to a small pool of
> > people who have access to and
detailed knowledge of
> > how to grow and weaponize the
highly lethal,
> > concentrated dry powder spores
of anthrax that were
> > sent in letters to media personalities
and members of
> > Congress last October. Specifically,
by virtue of his
> > government contracts, Hatfill
had access to the U.S.
> > Army Medical Research Institute
for Infectious
> > Diseases (USAMRIID) in Frederick,
Maryland, up until
> > early March. As one of a handful
of places in the
> > country where scientists grow
the most lethal germs in
> > order to develop vaccines to
defend against them,
> > USAMRIID and its Utah cousin,
Dugway Proving Grounds,
> > have been at the center of the
eight-month-old FBI
> > investigation. Last month, genetic
analysis of the
> > letter-anthrax suggested that
it was indistinguishable
> > from a strain developed at USAMRIID.
> >
> > Hatfill, who was employed as
an Ebola researcher at
> > USAMRIID from 1997 to 1999, has
since worked as a
> > government contractor who specializes
in training U.S.
> > Special Forces, embassy employees,
emergency workers,
> > and other government officials
to respond to
> > biological attacks. Today, Hatfill
continues to
> > perform bio-defense training
work, to which his
> > colleagues say he is passionately
devoted.
> >
> > Hatfill's longer biography is
riddled with gaps where
> > classified projects presumably
belong. The son of a
> > thoroughbred horse breeder, Hatfill
was born in St.
> > Louis, Missouri, in 1953, then
raised in Illinois. He
> > studied biology at small Southwestern
College in
> > Kansas, taking a year off midway
through to work with
> > a Methodist doctor in Zaire.
He graduated in 1975,
> > married in 1976, had a daughter,
and got divorced in
> > 1978. From 1975 to 1978, he served
with the U.S. Army
> > Institute for Military Assistance,
based at Fort
> > Bragg, North Carolina, while
simultaneously, his
> > resume says, serving in the Special
Air Squadron (SAS)
> > of the white supremacist regime
in Rhodesia. He
> > attended medical school in Rhodesia
from 1978 to 1984,
> > and then moved to South Africa,
where he completed
> > various military-medical assignments
while obtaining
> > three master's degrees, studying
for a doctoral
> > degree, and practicing in a South
African clinic.
> >
> > "After graduating from Southwestern
College," he wrote
> > his alumni newsletter, "Hatfill
received a medical
> > degree from the Godfrey Huggins
School of Medicine in
> > Rhodesia, with board certification
in hematological
> > pathology from South Africa.
The South African
> > government recruited him to be
a medical officer on a
> > one-year tour of duty in Antarctica,
and he completed
> > a post-doctoral fellowship at
Oxford University in
> > England. His military background
includes the United
> > States Army's Institute for Military
Assistance, the
> > Rhodesian SAS, and Selous Scouts
[Rhodesian
> > counterinsurgency forces]."
> >
> > There is something curious about
Hatfill's claim, on
> > his resume, to have worked concurrently
with the U.S.
> > Army Institute for Military Assistance
in Fort Bragg
> > and with the Rhodesian Special
Air Squadron. Indeed,
> > several of his associates have
told the Prospect that
> > Hatfill bragged of having been
a double agent in South
> > Africa -- which raises some intriguing
questions. Was
> > the U.S. military biowarfare
program willing to hire
> > and give sensitive security clearances
to someone who
> > had served in the apartheid-era
South African military
> > medical corps, and with white-led
Rhodesian
> > paramilitary units in Zimbabwe's
civil war two decades
> > earlier? Or did Hatfill serve
in the Rhodesian SAS,
> > and later in the South African
military medical corps,
> > at the behest of the U.S. government?
...
> >
> > Indeed, Hatfill has been offering
the press warnings
> > about bioterror-attack scenarios
for several years.
> > [see article
> > on web for details]
> >
> > In all his appearances in The
Washington Times,
> > Insight, and other print sources,
Hatfill stressed a
> > single, consistent message: The
United States is
> > woefully under-prepared for an
inevitable biological
> > terrorism scenario. It's a sentiment
shared by many of
> > Hatfill's colleagues in the U.S.
bio-defense community
> > - in particular, William C. Patrick,
one of the
> > founders of the U.S. biological
weapons program. ...
> >
> > In January 1999, Hatfill went
to work for Scientific
> > Applications International Corporation
(SAIC), a large
> > defense contractor. As a specialist
in biological
> > defenses working on contract
for various government
> > agencies, Hatfill continued to
have access to the Fort
> > Detrick lab; the Army's chemical
weapons defense
> > testing facility in Edgewood,
Maryland; Dugway Proving
> > Grounds in Utah; and other government
labs and
> > military facilities depending
on his assignments.
> >
> > ... Why did he lose his clearance
[in August 2001]?
> > One military official recounts
the story he says
> > Hatfill told him. In this
> > telling, the difficulties began
last summer, when
> > Hatfill allegedly applied for
a Top Secret/Sensitive
> > Compartmentalized Information
(TS/SCI) security
> > clearance in order to bid for
a top-secret contract
> > with a government agency, perhaps
the CIA.
> >
> > To qualify for this clearance,
he was reportedly
> > required to take a polygraph
test. Hatfill allegedly
> > told the military official that
> > he failed the polygraph on questions
concerning his
> > activities in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).
The people
> > conducting the polygraph were
amateurs, Hatfill
> > allegedly complained to his interlocutor;
they
> > couldn't understand what Cold
Warriors like himself
> > had to do in Rhodesia. The military
official recalls
> > Hatfill as saying that his father-in-law
had been
> > killed by rebels in Rhodesia,
and that he had
> > consequently undertaken some
actions that caused
> > concern when he was given his
polygraph test.
> >
> > Hatfill has appealed the loss
of his security
> > clearance in a process that is
pending. ...
> > ***********************************
> >
> > Anthrax Epizootic in Zimbabwe,
1978-1980: Due to
> > Deliberate Spread?
> >
> > Meryl Nass, M.D.*
> >
> > * Dr. Nass, at the time of publication,
was affiliated
> > with Wing Memorial Hospital,
Palmer, Massachusetts and
> > the Department of Internal Medicine,
University of
> > Massachusetts Medical School,
Worcester, MA USA. Her
> > continued work on anthrax is
available at her web site
> > http://www.anthraxvaccine.org
> >
> > Physicians for Social Responsibility
Quarterly 1992:
> > 2-198-209
> >
> > [Brief excerpts only in this
posting. Full version,
> > with footnotes, available at
> > http://www.anthraxvaccine.org/zimbabwe.html]
> > The largest recorded outbreak
of anthrax among humans,
> > and possibly the largest among
animals, occurred over
> > a decade ago in Zimbabwe, formerly
Rhodesia, during
> > the time of its civil war [1].
The outbreak was
> > reported in a series of articles
by J. C. A. Davies
> > and others [from 1980-1985] in
the Central African
> > Journal of Medicine [2-8]. Little
was written about it
> > outside of Africa. Over 10,000
human cases and 182
> > human deaths were documented
[9]. Human cases were
> > secondary to an unprecedented
outbreak in cattle
> > [5,10].
> >
> > Unusual Features of the Epizootic
> >
> > There were a number of surprising
aspects of this
> > epizootic. First, the large number
of cases was
> > unusual. Ten thousand seven hundred
thirty-eight human
> > cases were documented in Zimbabwe
from January 1979
> > through December 1980 [9]. According
to Mandell's
> > Principles and Practice of Infectious
Disease,
> > published in 1979, "about 7,000
cases are reported in
> > the world annually" [11].The
large number of human
> > cases was particularly unusual
in light of the
> > historically low prevalence of
anthrax in Zimbabwe
> > [5]. In the 29-year period preceding
the epidemic
> > (1950-1978), the period for which
records are
> > available, a total of 334 human
cases were reported in
> > Zimbabwe. By comparison, during
the same period
> > (1950-1978) in the
> > United States, 459 human cases
were reported [12].
> > Clearly, anthrax was a rare disease
in both countries.
> > ... Yet during the war, anthrax
became one of the
> > country's major causes of hospital
admissions.
> >
> > Second, the geographic scope
of this outbreak was
> > highly unusual for anthrax. Most
outbreaks are
> > characterized by a high degree
of focality [11]. Cases
> > occur in limited areas only.
Yet in Zimbabwe from 1978
> > to 1980, the disease spread from
area to area, until
> > six of the eight provinces were
affected [13]. ...
> >
> > Humans generally acquire the
infection by handling
> > meat or other products from infected
animals.
> > Butchering, preparing, and eating
meat from an animal
> > infected with anthrax are frequent
causes of the
> > disease in humans and accounted
for many cases in
> > Zimbabwe. ...
> >
> > Many of the Zimbabwe cases occurred
in areas where
> > anthrax had not been recorded
before. Yet in the rest
> > of the world, epizootics generally
occur in areas that
> > are known to have produced anthrax
outbreaks in the
> > past, where there is assumed
to be low-density
> > contamination of the soil. ...
> >
> > Fourth, the epizootic was almost
entirely confined to
> > the Tribal Trust Lands. These
were areas that had been
> > assigned to Zimbabwe's blacks
when the country was
> > divided into distinct areas for
black and white
> > habitation by the Land Apportionment
Act of 1930. ...
> > By the end of 1979, one-third
of Tribal Trust Lands
> > were affected with anthrax, approximately
17% of the
> > land area of the country [10].
Davies noted that "the
> > commercial (white-owned) farming
areas appear to have
> > been almost completely spared"
[5]. ...
> >
> > Fifth, the timing of the epizootic
coincided with the
> > final months of a long and particularly
brutal
> > guerrilla war. Some guerrilla
activity had begun in
> > the late 1960s, but the war did
not escalate
> > significantly until the mid 1970s.
The war ended in
> > late February 1980, when elections
were held, and ZANU
> > and ZAPU, the parties affiliated
with the two
> > guerrilla armies, won an overwhelming
victory. ...
> >
> > Human anthrax case reports by
month are available for
> > the provinces of Matabeleland,
Midlands, and
> > Mashonaland [5]. In Matabeleland
and Midlands, cases
> > peaked in November and December
1979, respectively,
> > and decreased thereafter. In
Mashonaland, there were
> > two peaks, the first in February
1980 and a second in
> > December 1980. After the war
ended in late February
> > 1980, only sporadic cases were
seen in previously
> > unaffected areas, and there appeared
to be no further
> > geographic spread of the epizootic.
However, anthrax
> > has remained enzootic in Zimbabwe
since the war ended,
> > a not surprising finding,
> > given the persistence of the
spores in nature.
> >
> > ...
> >
> > Weighing all available evidence,
it is suggested here
> > that a plausible explanation
for the sudden peak of
> > anthrax in the Tribal
> > Trust Lands beginning in November,
1978, is that one
> > or more units attached to the
Rhodesian military may
> > have air dropped anthrax spores
in these territories.
> > This action would expose cattle
to the disease through
> > ingestion or inhalation (or both)
of anthrax spores.
> > Humans would have acquired the
disease from meat or
> > meat products.
> >
> > ...
> >
> > Chemical and Poison Weapons
> >
> > Was there a parallel, well-documented
use of other
> > weapons considered abhorrent
during the conflict and a
> > willingness to overlook civilian
casualties? In his
> > memoirs, Flower admits to the
deliberate distribution
> > of poisoned clothing, which killed
hundreds of black
> > guerrillas [68]. Yet clothing
can be worn by anyone.
> > Organophosphate poisoning from
tainted clothing
> > affected civilians as well, and
poisoning by this
> > means became documented in the
Zimbabwe medical
> > literature [69,70].
> >
> > Dr. Paul Epstein, an American
physician practicing in
> > Mozambique for the Ministry of
Health, with support
> > from the American Friends Service
Committee in 1978,
> > treated large numbers of Zimbabweans,
who had arrived
> > from ZANLA training camps, for
a bleeding disorder.
> > Initially a viral hemorrhagic
fever was suspected. But
> > there were many deaths despite
treatment. Eventually a
> > fat biopsy was obtained and sent
for toxin analysis;
> > this analysis revealed the presence
of warfarin [71].
> > Thus another unconventional mode
of warfare, warfarin
> > poisoning, may have been employed
by some within the
> > Rhodesian military. ...
> >
> > Conclusions
> >
> > A case has been made for the
possible deliberate use
> > of anthrax as an agent of biological
warfare, directed
> > at African-owned cattle, in the
final months of the
> > Zimbabwe civil conflict.
> >
> > The characteristics of Zimbabwe's
anthrax epizootic
> > are unusual. Outside Zimbabwe,
outbreaks of animal
> > anthrax have remained confined
to enzootic areas or
> > could be traced to contaminated
animal products and
> > have been generally self-limited.
Zimbabwe's epizootic
> > did not conform to this expected
behavior, and the
> > arguments put forward to explain
it are unconvincing.
> >
> > A military role for anthrax can
be postulated, given
> > the strategic control of food
and other resources that
> > existed at the time.
> > Deliberate impoverishment of
rural blacks may
> > conceivably have been a strategy
as well. Desperate
> > tactics appear to have been used
by the Rhodesian
> > military elsewhere as the war
drew to a close.
> > Finally, there have been recent
reports attributed to
> > confidential eyewitnesses that
support the theory of
> > the deliberate spread of anthrax.
> >
> > *****************************************
> >
> > This material is being reposted
for wider distribution
> > by Africa Action (incorporating
the Africa Policy
> > Information Center, The Africa
Fund, and the American
> > Committee on Africa). Africa
Action's information
> > services provide accessible information
and analysis
> > in order to promote U.S. and
international policies
> > toward Africa that advance economic,
political and
> > social justice and the full spectrum
of human rights.
> >
> > Documents previously distributed,
as well as a wide
> > range of additional information,
are also available on
> > the Web at:
> > http://www.africaaction.org
> >
> > To be added to or dropped from
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> > write to apic@igc.org. For more
information about
> > reposted material, please contact
directly the source
> > mentioned in the posting.
> >
> > Africa Action
> > 110 Maryland Ave. NE, #508, Washington,
DC 20002.
> > Phone: 202-546-7961. Fax: 202-546-1545.
> > E-mail: africaaction@igc.org.
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